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Abstract
Article offers a comparative analysis of the geopolitical approaches from U.S. and Rus­
sian geopoliticians, Saul B. Cohen and Alexander Dugin, in determining the position 
of Europe­In­Between in contemporary World. The article presents a spatial definition 
of this term, introduced in the scientific literature by F. Tunjić, and an overview of this 
area in terms of maritime and continental geopolitics through the reflections of the above 
mentioned geopoliticians. We are also comparing the current geopolitical moment with 
the tendencies shown in the papers of these authors to determine the future geopolitical 
developments in the Europe­In­Between.
Key words: Europe­in­Between, Cohen, Dugin, geopolitics, continental powers, mari-
time powers
VMESNA EVROPA V OČEH COHENA IN DUGINA
Izvleček
Članek prinaša primerjalno analizo geopolitičnih pristopov ameriškega in ruskega geo­
politika Saula B. Cohena in Alexandra Dugina k določanju položaja Vmesne Evrope v 
sodobnem svetu. Prikazana je prostorska definicija termina, ki ga je v znanstveno literatu-
ro uvedel F. Tunjić, in pogled na to območje z vidika pomorskih in kopenskih geopolitik 
skozi razmišljanja omenjenih avtorjev. Poskušamo tudi primerjati sedanji geopolitični 
trenutek s tendencami, predstavljenimi v delih teh avtorjev, in določiti prihodnji geopoli-
tični razvoj v Vmesni Evropi.
Ključne besede: Vmesna Evropa, Cohen, Dugin, geopolitika, kopenske sile, pomor-
ske sile
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1. INTRODUCTION
The area bordered by the Baltic Sea to the north, the Adriatic and the Black Sea in the 
south, Germanic world in the west and the Russian expanses in the east, at the political 
map of Europe stands out with the obvious political fragmentation. Such a political con-
figuration has been a result of specific geopolitical circumstances in times of territorial 
organization of its component parts. The further analysis of previously geographically 
delimited area will use the term of Europe-In-Between1 which Filip Tunjić introduced in 
scientific literature by following the German term of Zwischeneuropa and the territorial 
reorganization of Europe after the World War I. Due to a specific role of this area, the 
term of Europe­In­Between best illustrates the geopolitical context in which this spatial 
unit rose and existed throughout the last century. Hence, Europe­In­Between is primarily 
a geopolitical term that has been developed and spatially defined after the World War I as 
a buffer zone between Germany and Russia as holders of opposing Germanic and Slavic 
identities, whose formation was dictated by the Western interests through conclusions of 
the Versailles Conference and the peace treaties with the defeated countries.
Europe­In­Between was recognized by British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder at 
the beginning of 20th century as the constant warfare area whose reorganization into so­
called ‘cordon sanitaire’ would make a buffer zone separating two opposing forces, Ger-
many and Russia. However, the real fear for Mackinder was the potential cooperation of 
these two continental powers, which would destroy the balance of continental and mari-
time powers, particularly the status of United Kingdom as the leading colonial power. 
Inspired by Mackinder, German geopolitician Karl Haushofer observed the advantages 
of cooperation of Berlin and Moscow, but he did not get the support of Hitler’s Reich 
(Pavić, 1973, pp. 361–362). Based on above, the article examines the spatial definition of 
Europe­In­Between in terms of geographic determinism by stressing the decisive forms 
of geographic determinism in shaping the geopolitical features of this region.
As the area of penetration of the Rimland into the Heartland2 by the eastward expan-
sion of the EU and especially NATO, the importance of Europe­In­Between nowadays 
takes on a new dimension. Thus, it is necessary to stress the comparative review of view 
on this area by leading U.S. and Russian geopoliticians, Saul B. Cohen and Alexander 
Dugin3, by putting their ideas in the context of accepting the theoretical viewpoints of 
the classics of political geography that geopolitical relationship in the World observe 
through relationship of maritime powers or the Rimland (maritime geostrategic sphere) 
and continental powers, or the Heartland (Eurasian geostrategic sphere). As a border 
zone, Europe­In­Between is discussed by both geopolitical considerations, by the East 
1 The term Europe-in-Between is translation of Slovenian original term Vmesna Europa introduced in the 
scientific literature by Filip Tunjić in his book titled Vmesna Evropa: Konfliktnost državnih teritorialnih 
meja (2004).
2 British geopolitician Halford Mackinder developed the theory of the Heartland as the Pivot of history. The 
U.S. author N. J. Spykman opposes the theory of the Rimland which identifies with Mackinder’s Inner 
Crescent around the Heartland.
3  Notice that some Western authors considered Dugin as a fascist, considering his views hostile to the West.
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and the West4. Thus, the article seeks to answer the question of the position of this area 
within the spatial relationships of the Heartland and the Rimland by the opposing geo-
political concepts of Cohen and Dugin. To provide the answers, the methodological ap-
proach of the article is based on a comparative analysis of geopolitical interpretation of 
spatial relationships by these authors, as well as the comparison of impacts of physico­
geographic and socio­geographic elements in creating of Europe­In­Between in  terms 
of geographic determinism and the historical method in the review of the genesis and 
development of this geopolitical unit.
2. SPATIAL FRAMEWORK OF EUROPE-IN-BETWEEN
At the beginning, it is necessary to stress the precise spatial definition of Tunjić’s 
Europe­In­Between and the historical overview of the evolution of territoriality5 in this 
area. Moreover, to understand the location of the region, these terms have to be precisely 
defined. Pavić says that the geopolitical position is a geographical location with the sig­
nificant factors for the internal political situation and especially for the foreign policy 
position of a state. Thus, the geopolitical position includes the combination of geographi­
cal and political factors. Moreover, “the geostrategic position (...) represents a kind of 
geographical and geopolitical location that considers the relevant military and strategic 
aspects on regional or global strategic level” (Pavić, 1973, pp. 94–95). As pointed out, 
Europe­In­Between includes border­states from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Adriatic 
and the Black Sea in the south, separating Germany and Russia, in the wider sense the 
West and the East. Although this unit should be a stability factor, the following events 
produced “the space of eccentricity, marginality and crushed peripherality” (Tunjić, 2004, 
pp. 144–145). This group of countries includes Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bela-
rus, Ukraine, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Croatia, and possibly Turkey.
Due to the similarity of terms Europe­In­Between and Central Europe, it is necessary 
to point out the differences in their meaning. Specifically, Central Europe or Mitteleuropa 
includes the area of the Holy Roman Empire and Austria­Hungary without the Balkans, 
geopolitically opposed to the European West and the East (Tunjić, 2004, p. 141). Accord­
ing to above, the overlap of spatial definition of Central Europe and Europe­In­Between 
is obvious. Europe­In­Between covers the eastern part of Central Europe, but also South-
eastern and the parts of Eastern Europe. However, it is hard to find the generally accepted 
spatial definition of Southeastern Europe. Due to lack of clearly distinguished northern 
4 The text will use the first capital letters for the East and the West in the political sense, while the first small 
letters will be used for east and west as the geographical terms.
5 According to Tunjić, there is a significant difference between the concepts of territory and territoriality: 
“Territory and territoriality are interdependent and conditioned – territoriality as the activity of conquest, 
control and defense, as well as the activity of territorial disintegration and integration; and the territory as an 
area or part of the area, which is defended and which is the subject to competition and requirements versus 
requirements of the others.” (Tunjić, 2004, pp. 26–27).
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natural boundaries of Southeastern Europe, or the Balkans, there are various regionaliza-
tions of this region. Also, the lack of its natural boundaries to the north and width of the 
east­west direction are the main reasons for disputing of peninsula features of this region 
(Pavić, 1973, pp. 129–140). However, considering the Balkans as a geopolitical and cul-
tural region (with an accepted border on the line from Rijeka Bay to Danube Delta), the 
region is spatially coincident with the contemporary meaning of territorial unit of South-
eastern Europe6. Meanwhile, during the 1990s a geopolitical term of western Balkans7 
was formed as a new geopolitical unit within this region with specific status in relation 
to the Euro­Atlantic integration, which included countries of former Yugoslavia and Al-
bania, but excluded Slovenia (Tunjić, 2004, pp. 245–246). Finally, Europe­In­Between 
includes parts of Eastern Europe such as Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, as the countries 
closely related to their eastern neighbour Russia, that are, using Russian or Dugin’s vo-
cabulary, part of the so­called Russian “closer neighbourhood” 8.
From the above, obviously Europe­In­Between is not a unique geographical unit in 
terms of geographic determinism. Indeed, while the northern part of the region lies in 
the Baltic plain, a traditional military corridor between the West and the East, its central 
part covers the Czech natural fortress followed by the Carpathian arc that surrounds the 
Pannonian Plain. Finally, with Dinaric and Pindus in the centre, the south of this unit is 
bordered by the Adriatic Sea in the west and Black Sea in the east. Thus, the fluidity of na-
tional boundaries in the north is explicable in terms of physico­geographic  determinism, 
since the boundaries do not generally follow natural barriers, in contrast to the bounda-
ries in the south. However, territorial fragmentation, primarily caused by social factors, 
is common feature of the whole region, which is the result of continuous fragmentation 
process of regional or political entities, known as balkanization9.
3. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE-IN-BETWEEN
Europe­In­Between was formed as a need of the West for a sanitary corridor  between 
Germany and Russia after the World War I. This area largely relies on Mackinder’s con-
sideration of the strategic security of the West from Russia or even more from eventual 
Russian­German cooperation. This unit was marginal in a wider temporal coverage. In 
ancient times the Roman limes followed Danube, separating Roman, later Christian, 
6 As a contribution, we add the possibility of inclusion of Hungary in the Balkan countries. Recall, Metternich 
argued that Asia (read Balkans) starts at Vienna train station, which means that areas eastward from Vienna 
do not share the ‘real’ European but Asian heritage, whether Ottoman or nomadic steppe tradition as 
Hungarians (Sowards, 1996).
7 Knowing that ‘eastern Balkans’ does not exist, obviously the western Balkans is a geopolitical brainchild of 
the EU, as “the laboratory of European social and spatial integration and disintegration” (Tunjić, 2010, p. 16).
8 Dugin says that this term is “the common name for the countries of the former USSR” (Dugin, 2004, p. 152).
9 The term ‘balkanization’ signifies a political fragmentation in the part of Europe that once was under the 
Ottoman rule. The similar term of Kleinstaaterei signifies the German political fragmentation within the 
Holy Roman Empire and the German Confederation. Applying these concepts in the political fragmentation 
of Europe­In­Between, such a fragmentation makes these small and weak states as the chessmen in a game 
of great powers (Tunjić, 2004, p. 12).
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civilization from the barbarians. In the Balkans, Drina was the border of the Eastern and 
the Western Roman Empire, the Eastern and Western Christianity. In the following cen-
turies, the border between Christianity and Islam, known as Antemurale Christianitatis, 
in the form of Military Frontier, passed from North Adriatic Sea, through the Pannonia, 
to the Carpathians and Wallachia. However, this demarcation line was not a classical 
boundary, but a frontier10 as a security zone from the Ottoman Empire, especially during 
its greatest expansion in the early modern period. In the 18th and 19th century frontiers 
and/or buffer zones disappeared through suppressing the Ottoman Empire from Europe 
and the Austro­Hungarian occupation and annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, 
Prussia, Austria­Hungary and Russia became direct neighbours through the three divi-
sions of Poland.
However, after the World War I and the restoration of Poland, by the ideas of Mack-
inder and with French support, there was a sanitary corridor established between Ger-
many and Russia, whose core constituted the alliance of Little Entente under the patron-
age of the West. Moreover, the first division of Germany came up in terms of territorial 
dis continuity of German state, by accepting of Mackinder’s ideas in Versailles and by the 
status of Gdansk as a free city and the access of Poland to the Baltic Sea, so East Prussia 
became separated from the rest of Germany. The purpose of this sanitary corridor was the 
separation of Germany and Russia, not only to prevent new wars, but also to prevent the 
possible alliance of these two continental powers, which would threaten the Versailles ar-
rangement that guaranteed the supremacy of Western Europe. Also, the sanitary corridor 
or Europe­In­Between should serve as a barrier of spreading the communism to the west. 
However, despite the fact that Karl Haushofer clearly perceived the advantages of the 
German­Russian alliance, the wheel of history has gone in a different direction, so the end 
of the World War II did not only cause division of Germany as a penalty for the war guilt, 
but also division of Europe as a whole by the two upcoming great powers.
The serious changes in Europe­In­Between were created by the bipolar division of the 
World during the Cold War, dividing two ideologically opposed blocks11. In new circum-
stances former buffer zone between Germany and Russia disappears and becomes a line 
border between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, whereby the former sanitary corridor (with 
East Germany) becomes an integral part of the Soviet sphere. In a wider context, outside 
of this demarcation line, during the Cold War the whole Europe became an inter­space 
between two opposing superpowers, while the Iron Curtain from the Baltic to the Adriatic 
Sea, as their contact line, became the boundary of the blocks. However, the geo political 
and geostrategic importance of Europe­In­Between raises again after the Cold War and 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Despite the Russian opposition, NATO has not only 
10 Philippe Moreau Defarges in his Geopolitical vocabulary defines the boundary as “a line that indicates 
where the territories of the two neighbouring countries start and end” (Moreau Defarges, 2006, p. 72). 
Radovan Pavić says that the boundaries are the lines that divide two sovereignties, while the frontier is as a 
narrow zone between two sovereignties. It is a zone of dynamic character that moves, expands or narrows 
as the state strengthens. 
11 Within this bipolarity the position of Yugoslavia should be distinguished as a member of the Non­Aligned 
Movement, as well as Albania, a Chinese ally, and neutral Sweden, Finland and Austria.
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crossed over the border of former blocks, but also stepped into the territory of the former 
USSR by the expansion in the Baltic states. Moreover, the integration of Romania and 
Bulgaria into NATO and the EU has weakened Russian influence in Southeastern Europe, 
and within it, in so­called western Balkans. Furthermore, persistent refusal of Brussels to 
apply the Schengen border regime in Romania and Bulgaria is another argument accord-
ing to which for their access in the EU adjudicated the geostrategic reasons instead of the 
criteria for membership.
The effects of political fragmentation of Southeastern Europe, primarily of the so­called 
western Balkans, were predicted by Radovan Pavić, one of the pioneers of political geogra-
phy in former Yugoslavia, who argued that the process of balkanization would create a series 
of small, economically and politically weak, and mutually antagonistic states, what would 
finally result in their insertion in the block structure (Pavić, 1973, p. 143). As a complement 
to Pavić’s visionary interpretation, from the position of the beginning of 21st century Tunjić 
points out that, through re­territorialisation of Europe, the Balkans did not experienced Eu-
rope without borders, but the Balkans with more borders (Tunjić, 2010, p. 57). Such geopo-
litical configuration nowadays largely formed Europe­In­Between as a inter­space between 
the West and Russia, for which Cohen notes that it could develop in a gateway to Russia 
rather than in shatterbelt (Cohen, 2003, p. 186). The western Balkans stands out within this 
area as shatterbelt or crushed belt (Tunjić, 2004, pp. 161–163).
4. EUROPE-IN-BETWEEN THROUGH THE EYES OF  
SAUL B. COHEN
At the beginning of his book Geopolitics of the World System, in determining of the geo-
political structure of the World for 21st century, Saul B. Cohen emphasizes the importance 
of the area that we recognize as Europe­In­Between for the West after the World War I, 
highlighting a danger of availability of this region for Germans and Russians (Cohen, 2003, 
p. 13). In the contemporary World, Cohen distinguishes three geostrategic realms12: the 
Atlantic and Pacific Trade­Dependent Maritime Realm, the Eurasian Continental Rus sian 
Heartland and mixed Continental­Maritime East Asia (Cohen, 2003, pp. 36–38, 63–93), 
noting the dominance of maritime areas in international trade exchange and the growing 
economic decadence of the Heartland by reduction of its geostrategic maneuver in the area 
that the author calls Eastern Europe and that we recognize as the parts of Europe­In­Be-
tween (Cohen, 2003, pp. 36–38). Tunjić’s Europe­In­Between lies between the Atlantic 
wing of Maritime Realm and the west wing of the Russian Eurasian Continental Realm. 
Within the term of Zwischeneuropa, but not­associating it with Mitteleuropa from 19th cen-
tury, Pavić emphasized the key role of Europe­In­Between in the position between the East 
and the West. Indeed, this region represents “the border land between two worlds” within 
the contemporary European geopolitical re­territorialisation (Tunjić, 2004, p. 147).
12 Cohen organized three levels of geopolitical structures: the first level is consisted of geostrategic realms 
as the largest units; the second level is consisted of medium­sized units or geopolitical regions, while the 
lowest level includes the national states, quasi­states and territorial subdivisions (Cohen, 2003, p. 33).
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Cohen pointed out that the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, 
with the unification of Germany and the eastward expansion of NATO and the EU, did 
not only brought changes in the balance between the Heartland and the Rimland, but 
also within the Rimland, particularly between the U.S. and the EU. In fact, while the 
Russian Heartland retreated in its continental centre, the EU has made a great spatial 
and population strengthening. Cohen explains the expansion of the Maritime Europe 
by putting its socio­economic development in the context of geographical determinism, 
noting rugged coastline and a maritime façade of Western Europe as a key factor in 
development of trade in the Mediterranean or the Baltic since the ancient times (Cohen, 
2003, pp. 88 and 149–150). However, the eastward expansion of NATO and the EU is 
unique geopolitical process, whereby, with the political one, this spread has military 
component for NATO, and the economic one for the EU. Furthermore, Cohen says 
that the Maritime Europe is not bounded by natural borders only in the east, which is 
why this border was extremely fluid through the ages. This geographical fact hides the 
basic geopolitical meaning of Europe­In­Between. In fact, while the USSR shifted that 
border westward to Elbe after the World War II, the recent expansion of NATO moves 
it significantly further eastward than ever before.
Ratzel says that each state tries to round its borders and to simplify the form of na-
tional territory with the aim of better linking of the core and the periphery. Therefore, 
the border is a fluid term open to constant changes, which implies that the border belt is 
reality and border line is an abstraction. However, since that border disputes lose their 
importance within the empire, the inclusion of the countries of Europe­In­Between in 
NATO and the EU reduces their border conflicts, but increases the importance of new 
eastern border of the club (Tunjić, 2004, p. 40; 2010, p. 56). Thus, it is not surprising that 
political geography as a scientific discipline developed precisely in this dynamic area 
(Ratzel), or on its edge (Kjellén). In new circumstances after the bipolar division, Europe­
In­Between (and Europe as a whole) comes back to ‘normality’ as the transitional area 
or inter­space in the full sense. Thus, in the contemporary era Cohen sees the area “from 
the Baltic, through Eastern Europe to the Balkans” as a potential shatterbelt, especially 
if geostrategic expansion of the West ignores Russian concerns about the penetration in 
its area of interest. Therefore, Cohen adds that “Central and Eastern Europe can develop 
in the gateway between the Russian Heartland and the Maritime Europe, rather than in 
shatterbelt, if leading powers treat them as an area of the cooperation instead of the com-
petition” (Cohen, 2003, pp. 53, 152 and 160–161).
According to Cohen, the eastward expansion of NATO affects the position of Ger-
many and Russia, although the author does not consider it as the intention to weaken the 
strengthening of the reunited Germany to calm Polish fears, but the opposite. Germany 
is a key stability factor of the alliance by which Poland develops ever closer economic 
relations (Cohen, 2003, pp. 163–164). Cohen says that the EU’s eastward expansion also 
affects the balance between the Maritime Europe and the Heartland, and the relations 
between Germany and Russia. Specifically, by the accession of the countries of Europe­
In­Between to the EU, Germany is no longer a peripheral country. Moreover, the reunited 
Germany in the enlarged EU becomes its central part, which corresponds to the U.S. 
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interests in the policy of euro­atlantism. Indeed, the role of the U.S., as a protector of the 
former West Germany from the Soviet threat, in the post­Cold War era has grown into a 
solid alliance between the U.S. and the reunited Germany whereby the closer cooperation 
between countries of Europe­In­Between and Germany involves their close cooperation 
with the U.S. Also, by investments, Germany takes on the role of a sponsor of these coun­
tries in their Euro­Atlantic path (Brzezinski, 2001, pp. 67–68). However, the character of 
the EU as a union of national states could reduce the central importance of Germany by 
the balance of the maritime England and France13 (Cohen, 2003, p. 171). Moreover, as 
the coordinator among the leading European partners in NATO, the U.S. does not count 
solely on Germany, but attempts to harmonize the alliance by balancing with other part­
ners through satisfying their individual interests.
Figure 1: Europe-In-Between as seen by Cohen (2003)
Slika 1: Vmesna Evropa kot jo vidi Cohen (2003)
13 Although the author mentions that strengthening of German position in the East puts a French influence 
in Europe in the shadow and that, therefore, France could slow the eastward expansion of the EU (Cohen, 
2003, p. 183), contemporary processes show the establishment of ‘Berlin–Paris axis’, which refers to a kind 
of auto­redefining of the position of France as not only maritime, but also continental power. Of course, this 
does not apply to the United Kingdom, which, as a strong U.S. ally, provides a strong counterweight to the 
German ‘continentalism’.
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However, Cohen believes that due to the incompatibility of Eastern and Western Eu-
rope exaggerated eastward expansion of the EU is not desirable. The author believes that 
the Maritime Europe ends at the part of Europe­In­Between, whereby only Czech Repub­
lic, Hungary and Slovenia deserve to be the member states of the EU because of their 
cultural and economic development, unlike the other countries due to their continental 
orientation. Finally, Cohen says that the EU’s eastward expansion is not justified by the 
socio­economic, but only by geopolitical aspects (Cohen, 2003, p. 172). Moreover, by the 
accession of the Baltic states, NATO came directly to the Russian border and encircled 
Kaliningrad exclave. Also, according to Cohen, the accession of Romania and Bulgaria 
concerns Russia for unimpeded use of the Black Sea, while the major threat to Russia is 
eventual expansion of NATO to Ukraine (Cohen, 2003, pp. 163–164 and 218).
Despite its weakened position after the Cold War, Cohen emphasizes Russian me-
diating role in conflicts, but with strengthening of its own positions in critical areas. In 
Europe­In­Between, the author highlights Russian mediating role between Ukraine and 
Romania in the dispute in oil and gas rich areas of the Black Sea. Also, Russia was a sup-
porter of the weakened Belgrade in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. However, direct 
NATO neighbourhood threatens the Russian position on the Baltic Sea and re­examines 
the significance of Kaliningrad district. These circumstances strengthen the relations be-
tween Russia and Belarus, a state without a strong identity and economically focused 
on Moscow, as an important link of Kaliningrad with stem­Russian territory. However, 
while Belarus’ loyalty has been unquestionable, Ukraine is internally split in the ethni-
cally Ukrainian agrarian west and industrial east with a large Russian community, which 
is a potential source of instability (Cohen, 2003, pp. 213–216).
For so­called western Balkans, Cohen says that it would be the best for the regional 
stability if Bosnia and Herzegovina falls apart in the way that Republic of Srpska joins to 
Serbia, the south­western areas inhabited by Croats to Croatia, while small cohesive Mus-
lim Bosnia14 remains. Furthermore, due to the concentration of Serbs in northern Kosovo, 
the author advocates the division of Kosovo, but warns on the possibility of destabilizing 
of Albania and the question of Preševo Valley in Serbia in the context of realisation of 
idea of Greater Albania. Also, Cohen notes connection of Montenegro with Serbia and 
especially Russia whose interest in the access to warm seas over these countries is still 
open (Cohen, 2003, pp. 219–220). Therefore, Cohen designated the area from the Baltic 
states, through Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova to the Balkans as Eastern Europe or the 
Heartlandic Periphery. However, many changes have happened since the publication of 
Cohen’s book, from the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU, to the independ-
ence of Montenegro and Kosovo, what was against the Russian interest in the Balkans, 
while the crippled Serbia became a closed continental country.
To conclude, Cohen perceived the area of Europe­In­Between as a region whose posi-
tion in the geopolitical structure of the World depends on relations between the Maritime 
geostrategic realm and Russia (the Heartland). According to Cohen, this area has a great 
14 Cohen never uses the full name of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus he writes ‘the southwest Bosnia’ 
instead of Western Herzegovina. Also, instead of Bosniaks, Cohen says the Muslims as was the practice 
in Socialist Yugoslavia.
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opportunity to be a gateway between these two geostrategic realms, but in the case of 
dialogue absence between them, Europe­In­Between is a prime candidate for conversion 
into shatterbelt. Let us add that the problem of border position of Europe­In­Between be-
tween continental and maritime forces at the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina is very 
precisely shown by Snježana Musa, who claims that this country in terms of shat terbelt is 
not able to become a unique country (Musa, 2001, p. 221).
5. EUROPE-IN-BETWEEN THROUGH THE EYES OF ALEX-
ANDER DUGIN
Serbian edition of Alexander Dugin’s book Basics of Geopolitics: Geopolitical Future 
of Russia confirms the importance of Serbia in geopolitical concepts of Russia arguing 
in the preface that “one who controls Serbia, controls the Balkans, and one who controls 
the Balkans, controls the vast Mediterranean strategic region” (Dugin, 2004, p. 5). The 
author’s introduction, highlighting Serbia as a central part of the Balkans, fits into the old 
Russian strategy for access to warm seas, whereby NATO’s control over the Turkish straits 
Figure 2: Europe-In-Between as seen by Dugin (2004)
Slika 2: Vmesna Evropa kot jo vidi Dugin (2004)
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makes the Balkans as the logical corridor to fulfil this longing. Dugin advocates the theory 
of clash of the Land and the Sea, the East and the West, as a geopolitical reality. The author 
considers geopolitics as a world view, not as a science in the traditional sense. Thus, Dugin 
develops the theory of telurocracy (the rule of the Land forces) and thalassocracy (the rule 
of the Sea forces), by comparing the relationship of the USSR and the U.S. with relations 
of ancient Rome and Carthage (Dugin, 2004, pp. 23–29). Also, similar to Cohen, accord-
ing to their power, the author highlights the hierarchical position of the countries within the 
geopolitical complexes of telurocratic or thalassocratic imperial units.
In the relationship of telurocracy and thalassocracy, Dugin argues that the German 
history from the national revival comes down to ‘non­Eurasian continentalism’. In fact, 
contrary to Dugin’s natural alliance of Germany and Russia, Germany fought both  against 
the Sea and the Land powers during both World Wars. Dugin explains it noting that Ger-
many, within its central position in Europe, ignored the importance of the central posi-
tion of Russia in Eurasia and its historical significance (Dugin, 2004, p. 89). However, 
the author emphasizes the crucial continental orientation of Central European countries, 
especially Germany (Dugin, 2004, p. 203). Moreover, French theorist Emmanuel Todd 
also points out that Germany is not a part of the core of the West and that Germany did 
not contribute to the development of liberal democratic movement in Europe in any way, 
stating that “Germany produced two worst totalitarian ideologies of 20th century, while 
England, America and France have been dominated by democratic conditions” (Rising 
literacy and a shrinking …, 2012). However, unlike Cohen sees France as an exclusively 
maritime power, Dugin gives to France the potential to choose its geopolitical orientation, 
saying that French shift towards thalassocracy implies turning to Anglo­Saxon world, 
while shift towards telurocracy means cooperation with Germany. Thus de Gaulle devel-
oped a thesis of “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals”, formed in “the spirit of moderate 
European continentalism” (Dugin, 2004, pp. 96 and 203).
Advocating the restoration of Russian power, Dugin calls for “gathering of the Em-
pire” around Russia­Eurasia to prevent the deterioration of Russian influence in the 
World. Otherwise, there is a possibility of the pressure on “the geographical pivot of 
history” from all directions. Dugin sees the Heartland only within the boundaries of the 
Russian Empire surrounded by the Rimland, stressing that Russia­Eurasia can only be 
continentally built if the western border of the continental geopolitical block ends with 
coastline, what does not include the territorial unification, but the alliance of the Eurasian 
Heartland and the Rimland “against the overseas occupiers” (Dugin, 2004, pp. 149–155). 
Dugin deems necessary precisely alliance with Germany to achieve Russian geopolitical 
ambi tions, which once was Mackinder’s main nightmare. The author sees Central Europe 
as “a natural geopolitical creation” which includes “the nations of the former Austro­
Hungary, Germany and parts of Poland and western Ukraine”. Hence, Dugin’s Central 
Europe, seen as part of the Rimland, obviously covers a large part of Tunjić’s Europe­In­
Between, whose eastern areas Cohen sees as the Heartlandic Periphery, and western areas 
as the Maritime Europe. Also, Dugin highlights the importance of the central position 
of Berlin and the consolidating role of Germany in Central Europe, whose influence can 
extend to the south (Dugin, 2004, pp. 193 and 369).
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Moreover, Dugin stresses the French ability to turn to “the alternative geopolitical flow” by 
recognizing the comparative advantages of Central Europe in continental geopolitical model, 
stating that the source of this shift can be traced from de Gaulle and Mitterrand onwards. Dugin 
adds that such a European Empire cannot achieve the full independence from the Atlantists 
without “creating of lasting geopolitical and strategic Moscow–Berlin axis” (Dugin, 2004, p. 
195). Cohen also predicted the possibility of such a scenario, stating that “the expansion of 
NATO and the EU” (in Europe­In­Between) “affected the balance of the Maritime Europe and 
the U.S., as well as the balance of “the Maritime Realm and the Russian Heartland” (Cohen, 
2003, p. 88). The central position of Germany in the enlarged EU is obvious in contrast to the 
previous edge position, what confirms Dugin’s claims about the importance of Berlin in his 
European Empire. Moreover, Cohen’s balance is also disrupted by two times larger number 
of the EU population in relation to the U.S. According to Dugin, the Moscow–Berlin axis pre-
vents “the organizing of sanitary corridor in Eastern Europe” (Europe­In­Between), whereby 
it should “aspirate (...) to break the illusions of inter­states about their potential independence 
from geopolitically powerful neighbours”, Germany and Russia. Dugin also notes that each 
bilateral relationship of any of the inter­states with Germany or Rus sia must include both 
partners, but without the Atlantists. Dugin adds that by the cooperation of these two countries 
Russia gets the access to the high technology and economic exchange with Europe, while 
Germany gets “the strategic protection” and “the independence from the energy reserves of 
the Third World under control of the Atlantists”. The author concludes that in the existing 
circumstances “Germany is the economic giant, but political dwarf”, while Russia is “the 
political giant, but economical cripple” (Dugin, 2004, pp. 198–199).
The independent Ukraine is the great risk for the implementation of Russian continen-
tal geopolitics, not so much because of the Black Sea, which, because of NATO’s pres-
ence in the Bosporus, cannot be the substitute for Russian access to the warm seas, but 
because of the penetration of the western impact on its own territory, manifested through the 
strengthen ing of Turkish influence in the south and the threat of further eastward expansion 
of the atlantism in the former sanitary corridor in Europe­In­Between that can be manifested 
by Ukrainian joining the alliance. Therefore Dugin claims that “the existence of Ukraine 
within its present borders and the current status of the sovereign state cause huge geopo-
litical blow to Russian security, intrusion on its territory” (Dugin, 2004, pp. 303 and 330). 
Based on the above, Dugin stresses the need of the alliance with Berlin (and Paris) to reduce 
the impact of NATO and the U.S. in Europe and to prevent the formation of a new sanitary 
corridor both hostile towards its western (Germany) and eastern neighbours (Russia), and 
whose potential members are the Baltic states, Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Hungary, Ro-
mania, Czech Republic and Slovakia. Dugin refers negatively to the Catholic states as the 
supporters of atlantism, saying that from the geopolitical viewpoint, they belong to Central 
Europe, gathered around unified Germany as a natural centre (Dugin, 2004, pp. 322–327).
Dugin divided the Balkan region into four zones:
• the Bosnian­Croatian (atlantistic, pure Rimland);
• the Serbian (Eurasian, the so­called Russian South);
• the Bulgarian (“the Levantine version of the Rimland” and eurasianism), and
• the Greek one (Orthodox, but atlantistic),
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noting Macedonia as a grain of conflict among the Orthodox countries, used by the 
Atlantists, which should be neutralized with Russian help (Dugin, 2004, pp. 301–302). 
Moreover, Dugin advocates the establishing of the Balkan Federation, what became un-
realistic by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU. Also, the author says that 
the unification with the ethnically related Moldova would make Romania as the link 
between Russia and Slavic Orthodox countries in the Balkans as the corridor to the 
Adriatic Sea. However, contemporary NATO’s Romania does not fit in this scenario 
(Dugin, 2004, p. 334). Moreover, Dugin stresses the traditional geopolitical orientation 
of Croats and Slovenes to Central Europe as the Austro­Hungarian heritage, and adds 
that the dissolution of Austria­Hungary and the creation of the first Yugoslavia was the 
result of the use of the powers of the East in the fight of the West against Central Europe, 
which French pragmatic support to the Serbs clearly explains (Dugin, 2004, p. 393). On 
the other hand, Dugin says that the geopolitical perspective of Serbia is extremely pro­
Russian in order to realize the Great Eurasian idea as a kind of ecumenical­continental 
Orthodox neo­byzantinism. Moreover, Dugin sees the Yugoslav Muslims as the pendant 
of Turkish atlantistic politics and advocates their turning towards Iran believing that ori-
entation to Turkey strengthens the atlantistic efforts to break the idea of Central Europe. 
The Macedonians still represent the huge problem as an Orthodox inter­ethnos between 
Serbs and Bulgarians (Dugin, 2004, pp. 394–396).
From the above, it is evident that Dugin sees the border between mostly Catholic Cen-
tral Europe (Mitteleuropa) and Orthodox Eastern Europe through the middle of Tunjić’s 
Europe­In­Between. However, Tunjić divides Europe­In­Between in “two strategically 
peripheral Europe­In­Between”. The ‘real’ or western one was formed in 1918 as a belt 
between Germany and Russia, the East and the West, as a strategic demarcation between 
them. In eastern one or ‘real’ Eastern Europe Tunjić sees “the European part of the former 
USSR without Russia, the Baltic states and Russian Kaliningrad exclave”. Despite this 
division of Europe­In­Between, Dugin ended with the need for assembling of these two 
units around its natural centres, Moscow and Berlin, and the establishment of the alli-
ance to resist to the atlantism of Western thalassocracy. In this way, according to Dugin, 
Europe­In­Between ceases to be a sanitary corridor or Trojan horse of the Western pow-
ers, but an integral part of the German­Russian continental alliance.
6. CONCLUSION
Observing the area of Tunjić’s Europe­In­Between, which mostly coincides with the 
former sanitary corridor established after the World War I as a buffer zone between Ger-
many and Russia, the conclusion is that the physico­geographical determinism played 
a significant role in creating of this region. Specifically, while the absence of relief bar-
riers in the north of Europe­In­Between largely affected the fluidity of the boundaries 
during the turbulent history, in the south of this geopolitical unit the state boundaries 
mostly coincide with relief barriers and rivers as a recognizable demarcation lines. More-
over, heterogeneous socio­geographic elements in Europe­In­Between and its position 
 between two opposing powers of various ethnic and religious groups, crucially affected 
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the geopolitical definition of this area as a buffer zone, frontier, shatterbelt or gateway 
region, depending on the current relationship of the powers that this unit separates.
The comparative analysis of theoretical approaches of U.S. geopolitician Cohen and 
his Russian colleague Dugin in case of Europe­In­Between as geopolitical unit located 
between Germany and Russia, the Rimland and the Heartland, or the West and the East, 
shows that both authors attach great importance to this area in geopolitical configura-
tion of the contemporary World. Accepting the idea of the geopolitical relations in the 
World as a permanent competition between continental and maritime powers, or teluroc-
racy and thalassocracy, the categorical stance of both authors is obvious in terms of area 
from which they come. While Cohen mostly considers Europe­In­Between as a part of 
the Heart landic Periphery, Dugin sees this unit as the pure Rimland thus emphasizing 
the role of Russia­Eurasia as the Pivot of history or the Heartland. Furthermore, Dugin 
sees Europe­In­Between as a contact area of the German Catholic­Protestant Central Eu-
rope or Mit teleuropa with the Russian Orthodox Eastern Europe who must be linked to 
eliminate the geopolitical subjectivity of the states that lay between the pivotal countries, 
Russia and Germany, and thus the possibility of establishing a new sanitary corridor and 
dominance of western alliance. However, nowadays Europe­In­Between has already been 
largely integrated into NATO and the EU, and thus really exists as an inter­space between 
Russia and Germany. Therefore, Cohen believes that the final function of Europe­In­Be-
tween as a gateway region or shatterbelt is variable according to the relationship between 
maritime and continental powers, NATO and Russia, and says that if this relationship is 
based on cooperation, Europe­In­Between acquires feature of the gateway between the 
East and the West, while Russian feeling of being threatened by NATO’s eastward expan-
sion can convert this region into zone of instability or shatterbelt.
Current geopolitical configuration indicates that, by the expansion of NATO and the 
EU, Europe­In­Between somehow acquires the features of new sanitary corridor, but the 
European dependence on Russian energy and trade exchange of the EU (especially Ger-
many) and Russia certainly transform Europe­In­Between into a gateway region. The 
Balkan part of Europe­In­Between still largely exists as shatterbelt open to various influ-
ences. However, the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to NATO and the EU, which 
interrupted the territorial continuity of the Orthodox countries as potential Russian allies, 
Russian influence in the Balkans has significantly weakened, especially by the independ-
ence of Montenegro and Kosovo. Therefore, so­called western Balkans, surrounded by 
NATO and the EU, becomes the inner courtyard of the West that waits for the political 
overhaul. Hence, as a result of the political restoration of the region, we can also observe 
the Croatian accession to the EU which was preceded by joining NATO.
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VMESNA EVROPA V OČEH COHENA IN DUGINA
Povzetek
Prispevek prinaša primerjalno analizo geopolitičnih pogledov priznanih geopolitikov, 
Američana Saula B. Cohena in Rusa Aleksandra Dugina, na položaj območja Vmesne 
Evrope v sodobni geopolitični podobi sveta. V prvem delu članek obravnava prostor-
sko definicijo termina ‘Vmesna Evropa’, ki ga je v znanstveno literaturo uvedel Filip 
Tunjić, in nato prikaz zgodovinskega razvoja te geopolitične enote. Namreč, prostor med 
Baltskim morjem na severu ter Jadranskim in Črnim morjem na jugu, ki ločuje Nemce 
in Ruse, je nastal v duhu versaillskega preurejanja političnega zemljevida Evrope kot 
posebno tamponsko območje med tradicionalno nasprotujočima si germansko in slovan-
sko identiteto. Poleg vloge Vmesne Evrope kot t. i. sanitarnega kordona med Nemčijo in 
Rusijo prikazuje prispevek tudi razvoj mejnega položaja tega dela Evrope skozi daljše 
časovno obdobje, vse od rimskega cesarstva do današnjih dni. Posebno je izpostavljen 
problem natančnega prostorskega definiranja Balkana oziroma Jugovzhodne Evrope, kot 
tudi drugih sodobnih geopolitičnih konstrukcij, recimo t. i. zahodnega Balkana. V tem 
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okviru posveča prispevek posebno pozornost vlogi geografskega determinizma, tako fi-
zično­ kot družbenogeografskega, pri nastajanju političnega zemljevida Vmesne Evrope 
oziroma pri spremenljivosti njenih meja.
V drugem delu članek podrobno predstavlja prostor Vmesne Evrope z vidika pomor-
ske in kontinentalne geopolitike skozi razmišljanja obeh omenjenih geopolitikov, Ame-
ričana Cohena in Rusa Dugina. Četudi je pri obeh avtorjih prisotna interpretacija geopo-
litičnih odnosov na prostoru Vmesne Evrope z vidika klasičnega razumevanja spopada 
med pomorskimi in kontinentalnimi silami, poskuša ta prispevek predstaviti jasno razliko 
med ameriškim in ruskim pogledom na ta prostor, ki jo lahko prepoznamo predvsem pri 
njunem določanju meja geopolitičnih regij ravno na prostoru Vmesne Evrope.
Na osnovi predstavljenih stališč Cohena in Dugina poskušamo v članku primerjati 
sedanji politični trenutek s tendencami, predstavljenimi v delih navedenih avtorjev, in 
na tej osnovi ugotoviti nadaljnje tendence prihodnjih geopolitičnih gibanj na prostoru 
Vmesne Evrope. Ob tem je posebna pozornost namenjena Nemčiji in njenemu središč-
nemu položaju v razširjeni Evropski uniji, zaradi katerega ima izrazito močan vpliv na 
politične procese v Vmesni Evropi in s tem tudi na definiranje odnosov med Evropsko 
unijo in Rusijo. V širšem okviru prispevek problematizira pomen širjenja zveze NATO 
in tudi Evropske unije v kontekstu odnosov med Zahodom in Vzhodom in s tem tudi 
perspektive geopolitične orientacije držav Vmesne Evrope, s posebnim poudarkom na 
državah evropskega jugovzhoda.
(Iz hrvaškega jezika prevedel Karel Natek)
